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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF .CONTRACTS TO SELL
LAND
Various explanations have been seized on by the courts, in
an endeavor to explain why a court of equity will in nearly
every instance grant specific performance of a contract for the
sale of land. Of these th6 explanation offered by Sir John
Leach1 is often quoted -by the courts and has a strong influence
in directing the courts to decree specific performance. This ex-
planation is .that specific performance is given, not because of
the real value of the land, but because the damages at law, which
would be calculated upon the general money value of the land,
'may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the
land may have a peculiar and special value. It is taken for
granted that damages would be inadequate, and specific per-
formance is erfunetorilv granted. There is probablv moi'e
hitorical accuracy in the reason given by Justice Peterson, to
the effect that, "Equity adopts this principle, not because land
is fertile, or rich in minerals, but because it is land, a favorite
'and favored subject in England and every country of Anglo-
Saxon origin."2
Whatever the explanation may be, it is generally undisputed
that ;where land or any interest in land is the subject matter
of an agreement, equity has jurisdiction to enforce specific per-
formance, and it does not dejend upon the inadequacy of the
legal remedy in the particular case. It is as much a matter of
course for the courts of equity to decree specific performance
of a contract for the conveyance of real estate, which is in its
nature unobjectionable, as it is for courts of law to give dam-
ages for its breach.3
This is the generally accepted rule throughout the juris-
dictions of this country. However, it has not been universally
:applied. In a case Where the complainant (vendee) set up that
he had contracted to convey'the land in question to a third party
for a certain price, and asked a conveyance from the defendant
(vendor) who was solvent, for the purpose of making the con-
veyance to such third party, the bill showed that the vendee's
legal remedy was adequate, and was dismissed. Such was the
'Adderly v. Dixon, 57 Eng. Reprint 239.
2K~tqhen v. Herring, 42 N. C. 190.
3Clafie v. Cagle, 141 Ga. 703, 82 S. E. 21, 21 L. R. A. 1915A 367.
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holding in Hazetbn v. MiNer, a District of Columbia case which
wes affirmed by the Supreme Court.4 To -the rule applied in
this case to this particular situation, thefe are exceptions and
authority to say, that even if a contract is made concerning land
merely for the purpose of transferring it to a third party, that
equity will give specific performance. If the rights of the third
party (purchaser.of the vendee) are omitted for the sake of the
contention, such a decision clearly gives specific relief because
the subject matter is land. The vendee- has no other interest
than th6 realization of a profit from its sale. The land has no
particular value to him. Damages could satisfy the same as de-
livery over the land itself. Yet such relief in the particular
case has been allowed.5 But in South Carolina, the court has
held-that a contract for the gale of land will not be specifically,
enforced, where practically no earnest money has been paid, and
the object' of the purchaser in desiring enforcement was merely
to speculate.
Pomeroy, in concluding his discussio of the specifie per-
formance of land contracts, says in part, "Land is often, espec-
ialy in this country, bought and held simply as merchandise,
for mere purposes of pecuniary profit, possessing. no interest in
the eyes of the purchaser and owner, other than its market value.'
The jurisdiction, however, extends'to *these cases. The rule hav-
ing once been established is now universally applied. The actual
motives and designs of the purchaser are never inquired into,
for it is assumed in every instance that damages are inadequate
Telief for the breach of a land contract.' "7
In thle foregoing statement, the holding in Hazeltonv. Mifler
and the few cases that follow that case are 'entirely ignored.
Pomeroy, perhaps intended that any bearing that these excep-
,tional cases would have on the law as it is generally accepted in
this country would be too negligible for consideration. Clark,8
in his treatise of the subject, crit6ises the holding in Hazeton
v. Miller. very severely. He says, "In Hazelton v. Miller it was
'Hazelton v. Mi ler, 25 App. Cas. (D. C.) 337. Affirmed 202 U. S. 71.
5Solomen Mier Go. v. Hadden 148 Mich. 488,Ill. N. W. 10,40; Rhwr-
-man v. Freeman, 117 S. C. 480, 109 S. E. 406.Schmidt v. Whittier, 103 S. E. (S. Q.) 553.
' Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts, (Third Ed. sec.
10).
' Clark on Principles of Equity, (see. 43).
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held that the fact that the plaintiff purchased, and contracted to
sell the land to a third person, showed that the plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law, and hence was not entitled to specific
performance. This holding is objectionable, not only because
specific performance in land contracts has become a matter of
right, but also because it deprives the third person of specific
performance; furthermore, it subjects the plaintiff to an action
for damages at the suit of the third person, and while it is pos-
sible that he will be able to collect from the original vendor an
equivalent amount, such a result seems inconsistent with the de-
sire of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits." Both of these
eminent authorities seem to be fully in sympathy with the view
that where land is the subject matter of the contract, that speci-
fic performance should be decreed. Clark expresses the opinion
that it is doubtful if this holding or any others of like tenor will
be followed. A case following Hazelton v. Miller is-commented
on in volume eighteen of the Harvard Law Review. 9 The writer
remarked, that the court entirely overlooked the fact that by
refusing plaintiff the relief requested, that was not only expos-
ing him to an action by his purchaser, but was also depriving
the latter of his right to specific performance of his contract.
These criticisms seem well grounded, especially in the last
instance mentioned. Land is what the third party has bargained
for. Damages at law may be entirely unsatisfactory to him, yet
he is forced to accept damages instead of the land because the
party from whom he has purchased is as adequately compensated
with damages as he would be with the land itself. It is doubtful
that the case of Hazelton v. Miller extends this far. While the
bill alleged that the vendee had entered into a binding con-
tract with a third party, it did not show that the third party
was asking performance of the contract by the vendee. If the
original vendor and vendee are the only ones involved, then
the court is possibly in a better position to award damages, but
where the third party is demanding specific performance, dam-
ages are not sufficient.
Maine and Pennsylvania are jurisdictions that require an
allegation of inadequacy of remedy at law under provisions of
0 Shafer v. Russcll, 79 Pac. (Utah), 559, 18 Harvard Law Re-
view 625.
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a statute. Unless the plaintiff is able to make such allegation,
the relief requested is denied.' 0
In Kentucky, the rule appears to be, although there is no
direct language to the effect, that if a contract to convey land is
not otherwise objectionable, the court of chancery will decree
specific performance, and it is not incumbent upon the party
seeking such relief to show that his remedy at la* would be in-
adequate. In the following language of the court, speaking of
contracts for the sale of land, it would appear that Kentucky is
with the overwhelming weight of authority. "Whether we con-
sider the contract on the part of Beal as executed or not, the
ground upon which a court of equity may take jurisdiction of
the case, is equally manifest. Considering the contract as un-
executed on the part of Beal, as it is on the part of M'Gee, it
would be the peculiar province of a court of equity to decree its
specific -execution; and it is well settled, that either vendor or
vendee may resort to a court of equity for that purpose.'" In
the case of Mills v. Metcalf,'= the court in reversing the lower
court for sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's plea for specific
performance, said, "Where the contract for land has not been
performed, though a party complaining might have had an
action at law on his covenant, yet he may resort to equity for
specific performance, and may shape his bill for specific per-
formance or cancellation of the contract."I
Other and later cases' 3 have held, that specific performance
of a contract for the sale of real estate does not go as a matter
of course; but is withheld or granted according to equity and
justice may seem to demand under the circumstances in the
case. A first impression of such language would seem to be
contrary to the holdings inthe earlier cases, but in reality the
court only has reference to those cases where it would be mani-
festly inequitable to decree specific performance, due to some
other objectionable feature of the contract, and not because
the plaintiff could be compensated in damages.
"Porter v. Frenchman Bay & Mt. Land & Water Co., 84 Me. 195, 24
Atl. 814; Kaughman's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 383.
SM'G1ee v. Bell, 3 Littell 190.
"8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh) 477.
3BZuegrass Realty Co. v. Shelton, 148 Ky. 666; 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
384; Clifton Land Co. v. Rei8ter, 198 Ky. 462, 247 S. W. 1008.
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From these, observations, the status of the law today upon
this question can not be disputed. Excluding those cases, that
are treated more or less as anomplies in the law, it can be safely
said that it is ,the universal rule that specific performance Will
be given in any contractfor the sale of land.
EINRY Cox.
